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In recent years, automotive industry has seen some of the most fundamental changes in its 
competitive landscape. Companies are not only acquiring potential competitors but also 
using technological innovations to streamline their internal operations to provide best 
value to their stakeholders. In order to deliver superior shareholder returns in this ever-
changing marketplace, Ford Motor Company has redefined its vision from being a 
leading automotive company to becoming world's leading consumer company providing 
quality automotive products and services. To help achieve the new corporate vision, 
Manufacturing & Plant Engineering organization of Ford Powertrain Operations has 
proposed a new manufacturing strategy involving flexibility and centralized 
manufacturing of cylinder heads, one of the most critical components of an internal 
combustion engine. 
The purpose of this paper is to explore various strategic issues that would be 
associated with the proposed strategy. The paper is organized as follows. First, 
management's rational behind the new strategy is presented. This is followed by a 
literature review in the area of manufacturing strategy, flexibility and centralized 
manufacturing. Next, analysis of cylinder head manufacturing at Ford Powertrain 
Operations is discussed. Benchmark data on engine manufacturing at Honda and Toyota 
follows this analysis. Finally, major action items are recommended to management of 
Ford Powertrain Manufacturing and Plant Engineering organization to successfully 
implement the proposed manufacturing strategy. 
2. Rational for New Strategy 
Cylinder head is one the five strategic components of an internal combustion engine1. 
Except for connecting rods and camshafts, these strategic components have traditionally 
been manufactured by automotive original equipment manufacturers (OEMs) in-house 
and in the same plant where engines are assembled. Further, majority of the machining 
lines in these engine plants are modular transfer machines dedicated to certain engines 
types only. Any change in engine design or mix that these machining lines have to handle 
is not only expensive but also time consuming due to retooling of the dedicated 
equipment. This generally causes the capacity utilization to vary across different engine 
plants. For instance, a truck engine plant at Ford would generally run at 120% of the 
capacity due to high demand for trucks where as plant making engines for cars would 
exhibit a low capacity utilization of 60% owing to poor demand for cars. Yet due to 
dedicated equipment, manufacturers cannot switch production of truck engines from truck 
engine plants to car engine plants. This not only increases cost of manufacturing but also 
prevents OEM from responding quickly to changes in the market. 
The objective of the proposed strategy is to improve capacity utilization of Ford's 
engine manufacturing facilities while reducing cost through economies of scale and scope 
and improving manufacturing's ability to handle changing consumer requirements. Since 
cylinder head exhibits frequent changes in its design due changing market needs, 
management believes that consolidating the manufacturing of cylinder heads for various 
engines in a centralized flexible facility will help them achieve their strategic goals. 
1Strategic components of an internal combustion engine are camshaft, connection rod, crankshaft, cylinder head, and 
cylinder block. Collectively they are called 5Cs. 
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3. Literature Review 
This section presents a summary of the published work in the area of manufacturing 
strategy, manufacturing flexibility, and centralized manufacturing. In particular, it focuses 
on major enablers for manufacturing flexibility, outlines pros and cons of centralized 
manufacturing, and provides framework to successfully implement an innovation such as 
flexibility (See Exhibit 1 and Exhibit 8). Findings of the literature review are used in the 
next section to analyze cylinder head manufacturing at Ford Powertrain Manufacturing. 
3.1. Role of Manufacturing Strategy 
Skinner [16] is one of the first authors who recognized the strategic role of manufacturing 
function in business and corporate competitiveness. Since then, several authors have 
published their viewpoints regarding manufacturing strategy. Despite differing opinions, 
there are few common constructs that have emerged from the published literature. First, 
authors agree that prime aim of manufacturing strategy is to support the organization's 
achievement of a long term sustained competitive advantage. Second, they suggest that 
development of manufacturing strategy should follow a top-down approach where 
corporate strategy drives business strategy, which in turn drives strategies for 
manufacturing and other business units. Third, manufacturing strategy provides 
competitive advantage to organization by helping it excel on five key competitive 
priorities: cost efficiency, product quality, delivery speed, delivery dependability and 
flexibility. The relative importance of these objectives of manufacturing strategy depends 
upon the market in which organization competes. Finally, manufacturing strategy can be 
characterized as a consistent pattern of individual decisions in certain key strategic areas 
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such as capacity, facilities, technology and the likes. Exhibit 3 shows manufacturing 
priorities and decision areas of manufacturing strategy according to some selected 
authors. 
3.2. Flexibility 
In most of the cited manufacturing strategy work, flexibility has been regarded as having 
an important role in organization's manufacturing strategy. It is not only one of the 
aforementioned competitive priorities but also influences other the competitive priorities 
(dependability, cost, speed and quality). In a recent census by Industry Week [15], 
companies ranked flexibility and agility as their #1 manufacturing strategy for 21st 
century, ahead of cost reduction (ranked #2). Although benefits of manufacturing 
flexibility have been well understood, managers have often found themselves frustrated 
with their inability to make their plants realize these benefits. This section highlights 
some of the major enablers managers need to concentrate on while formulating plans to 
implement flexibility in their plants. These enablers include nature of flexibility desired, 
nature of resources required, internal processes, measuring flexibility, and management 
attitude towards flexibility. 
3.2.1. Nature of flexibility desired 
One of the most fundamental roadblocks to incorporating flexibility in a plant is the 
failure to properly establish the nature of flexibility required. Flexibility means different 
things to different people. For instance, one manager might call the ability to seamlessly 
change from one product to the another as flexibility while another manager might refer 
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to the ability to ramp up volumes to meet market demand as flexibility. There is no 
general consensus among leading authors on the classification of flexibility. Exhibit 5 
gives various dimensions and types authors have proposed in the literature to classify 
flexibility. However, classification by Upton [17] is found to be most comprehensive and 
relevant to the scope of the current research. He suggests that whether one is referring to 
products, production volumes or manufacturing processes, flexibility in any plant be 
about increasing range, increasing mobility or achieving uniform performance across a 
range. Range refers to the ability to make different types of products in different volumes. 
For instance, it could mean small volume of highly dissimilar products or large volumes 
of slightly different products. In other words, range refers to product or volume or 
manufacturing process flexibility. Mobility refers to plant's ability to change nimbly from 
making one product to another. This kind of flexibility is associated with quick response 
time. It allows plants to minimize long runs and follow demand without excessive 
inventory. Uniform Performance refers to plant's ability to continue to perform well as it 
moves away from its most favored set of parameters. For instance, some plants perform 
well when making some particular product or when operated at some particular volume. 
Their performance falls off steeply if the operating pattern deviates sharply from the 
norm. 
The choice of the flexibility should come from the objectives of manufacturing 
strategy, which in turn are driven by the corporate business strategy of the company. In 
general, manufacturing managers should concentrate on the flexibility that would provide 
long term sustainable competitive advantage to their company. 
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3.2.2. Nature of Resources Required 
The nature of the resources required in the plant would depend upon the type of flexibility 
desired. The two most important resource types managers need to focus on are workforce 
and technology. 
Workforce 
Building the right workforce is one the most important tools managers can use to make 
their plant flexible. Upton [17], in his research, reported that workforce experience is an 
important factor in determining the operational flexibility of a plant. He found that long 
service was correlated positively with the range and negatively with mobility. His 
argument was that experienced crew held very rigid views about the way the plant should 
be operated and regarded any switching from those established parameters as making 
improper demands on the plant. Also, experienced crew was better at handling product 
variety simply because of their extensive knowledge base. On the other hand, younger 
crew viewed change as defining part of their jobs and was much amenable to switching 
from one job to another. In short, if one is looking to manufacture highly customized 
products, i.e. increasing range, it will need highly experienced workforce to make these 
products. Similarly if response time (mobility) is desired, one will need to build a work 
force that is less traditional and more apt to changing environment. 
Another aspect of proper workforce is training and generally most overlooked by 
manufacturing managers striving for plant flexibility. Training is an important tool for 
building operational flexibility in a plant because of several reasons. First, it provides 
necessary skills required for carrying out news tasks. (For instance, ability to run different 
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types machines, monitoring different types of manufacturing processes, setting up 
machines for different types of products etc.). Second it helps to change old non-flexible 
mindset through proper communication and education. Training should be used to 
emphasize the importance of flexibility to the workforce. Third, it helps to build 
confidence especially when people are afraid that trying new and different things might 
expose their ignorance. Fourth, it provides a sense of common purpose. Finally, it can 
help negotiations with unions especially when flexibility might be reducing the number of 
workers. 
Technology 
Likewise workforce, proper technology is another key driver to achieving plant 
flexibility. Today, managers have wide range of technologies to pick from - conventional 
or flexible transfer machines, flexible high speed machines or manufacturing cells, high 
speed machining centers, conventional manufacturing cells, or standard machining 
centers. Although the discussion about various systems is beyond the scope of this paper, 
there few key issues that managers need to keep in mind while selecting such systems. 
First, managers should base their decision for the technology on the nature of flexibility 
that they desire. For instance, one type of equipment may be capable of making large 
range of products while another may possess quick-changeover capabilities. However, 
former is of no use if product variety is minimal. Second, managers should be prudent in 
deploying flexible machining systems. For instance, instead of making every machine on 
production line flexible, they should use flexible machines only for those operations that 
see frequent product variation. This also obviates the risk of over investing in the 
technology. Similarly, unbridled implementation of automation should also be viewed 
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critically especially considering that such a deployment has been found to negatively 
effect flexibility [17]. Technology should be viewed only as a tool to achieve flexibility 
rather as a total solution in itself. Third, managers should work with machine tool 
manufacturers to standardize both current and future components (internal and external) 
of the machine tool. This not only makes the expansion of the current machine easier and 
economical but also helps worker seamlessly move from one machine to another. 
Japanese manufactures are the epitome of prudent machine tool selection. Toyota, 
for instance, facilitates flexibility in their machines is by mutually agreeing with machine 
tool suppliers on a long-term architecture for machines. This helps them to economically 
and easily add or delete modules to their existing machines. Also, it invests in machines 
that helps worker in carrying his job efficiently rather merely automating the operation. 
3.2.3. Internal Processes 
In addition to proper workforce and technology, management also needs to streamline 
various internal plant processes that might need changes due to new emphases on plant 
flexibility. These processes could include work practices, incentive systems, production 
planning and management, quality inspection procedures, tool changes, and the likes. 
Since, quite a few of these internal processes are direct consequence of company's 
production system, changing them would be hard. 
Kaplan [9] also suggests changing internal cost accounting system, primarily due 
to increased content of machine hours used within flexible plants compared to labor hours 
in traditional plants. Improper allocation of overhead could result in transfer pricing issue 
especially when the plant is considered a profit center. This implies that no longer plants 
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could rely on standard costing system to properly cost different products they 
manufacture in their plants especially if they produce lots of different products for 
external or internal customers. 
3.2.4. Measuring Flexibility 
In addition to right workforce, pertinent technology and streamlined processes, managers 
also need to find ways to measure flexibility they are seeking and need to emphasize the 
importance of these measures to their workforce. Upton's [17] research indicates that 
managers at most plants, where flexibility didn't produce desired results, relied primarily 
on financial measures (such as capacity utilization, total cost etc.) that had no connection 
to flexibility. On the other hand, plants that were flexible in terms of range and mobility 
tended to have clear non-financial measures (such as changeover times, lead times, 
process range etc.) to guide them. This is not to say that financial measures should be 
abandoned. Rather, they should be modified and (or) supplemented with those 
emphasizing the importance of flexibility as well. 
Kaplan [9] in his research identified a handful of companies that institutionalized 
new ways to measure their manufacturing performance and productivity especially due to 
influx of new manufacturing practices such as JIT, factory automation, CM and the likes. 
For instance, GE identified externally focused measures that give value to its customers 
and support the goals of the business. Exhibit 6 shows the hierarchy which GE 
management selected to measure its manufacturing excellence. It is important to 
understand that these measures originate from customers and shareholders both of which 




increased scrap or reworks or warranty or as increased overheads to maintain the existing 
level of quality. 
3.3.4. Risk Diseconomies 
The more a firm centralizes its manufacturing, the more it is dependent upon the 
successful operation of that plant. Should a natural disaster (flood, fire, hurricane, 
earthquake, etc.) or a human calamity (labor strike, accident, management demise) or any 
other breakdown strike the plant, the performance of the whole company will be seriously 
hurt. Thus companies should prevent "too many eggs in one basket" situation by 
allocating the production of certain critical components or products into two or more 
separate locations. 
3.4. Effect on Quality, Cost and Timing 
No definite conclusions could be made on the effect of flexibility or centralized 
manufacturing on quality, cost and timing in the published literature. However, few 
empirical observations have been made. For instance, in a recent survey of manufacturing 
plants, Industry Week [15] reported that companies who focused on enhancing their 
flexibility and agility experienced less scrap and rework, higher first pass yield, and less 
late delivers compared to those who focused solely on improving their cost structure. 
Similarly, an empirical study by O'Leary-Kelly et al. [12] indicated that new product 
flexibility had a positive effect on product quality and negative effect on cost while 
volume flexibility helped lower unit manufacturing costs and late deliveries. These 
authors hypothesized that new product flexibility is most often accompanied with 
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deployment of computer aided design (CAD) systems and implementation of 
simultaneous engineering techniques, both of which tend to increase quality, however, at 
additional costs. Further, authors argued that volume flexibility help companies avoid 
inventory build up (and the associated cost) while enhancing their capability to adjust 
their production to meet demand in timely manner. 
3.5. Innovation Management 
Since flexible manufacturing is an innovation, analyzing its adoption and implementation 
as a "strategic management of innovation" can also yield good insight to potential 
roadblocks firm could face. Afuah [1] suggests that firms generally face several economic 
and organization challenges when implementing the decision to adopt an innovation. 
Economic roadblocks include fear of loss of revenues, lack of incentive to invest in the 
innovation, fear of being stranded in a small network, and large exist costs. 
Organizational impediments include obsolesce of existing capabilities, political power 
coalitions, emotional attachment to old technology, firm's dominant logic, and fear of 
losing a competence builder in the old technology. As shown in Exhibit 7, firms can 
expect different roadblocks to be in effect depending upon the impact of innovation on 
firm's capabilities and products. 
Afuah also suggests that firm's abilities to overcome these roadblocks and 
successfully implementing the decision to adopt innovation depends largely on the fit 
between its strategy, structure, processes and systems, and people (S3P), as shown in 
Exhibit 8. For instance, a firm, whose strategy is to rapidly introduce new products, 
would need to have an organization that promotes creativity, where people can effectively 
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articulate market needs and where incentive system rewards employees for new ideas. It 
is important to understand that fit needs to exist only within the realm where innovation 
will be implemented. For instance, a strategic business unit of big corporation, in order to 
innovate, might exhibit strategies, systems and people that fit quite well within that 
business unit but the same S3P could depart from the company's norm (e.g. GM versus 
Saturn). 
4. Cylinder Head Manufacturing 
As mentioned earlier, Manufacturing and Plant Engineering management at Ford 
Powertrain Operations is considering a new plant strategy that will consolidate the 
manufacturing of cylinder heads in a centralized flexible facility. This section presents an 
analysis of this strategy highlighting critical areas that would need management attention. 
In particular it discusses major decision areas and competitive priorities associated with 
this manufacturing strategy, as shown in Exhibit 9. 
4.1. Overview 
Cylinder head is one of the most critical and frequently changed components of an 
internal combustion engine. Its design varies not only within a particular engine family 
but also across different engine families. Within each family, variations occur primarily in 
terms of feature locations whereas across the families variations occur in terms of overall 
dimensions. For instance two cylinder heads, despite belonging to same engine family 
(V6 six-cylinder engine), could differ in terms of cylinder size and oil hole locations. 
However, the overall topology of the cylinder head doesn't change much. Cylinder heads 
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can also vary in terms of their material (cast iron, steel or aluminum). Final variation can 
come from tolerances that are required on the manufactured component. Tolerances 
generally depend upon the overall design of the engine. Differences in material and 
tolerance most often cause changes in the process needed to manufacture cylinder heads. 
However, these process variations are generally limited to just a handful of operations. 
Under the current manufacturing strategy, cylinder heads are manufactured in the 
same plant, though in a different department and line, in which the engine is assembled. 
Different engine plants build one or more different engine families. These plants are 
located both in United States (primarily in Midwest) and in Europe. Further, cylinder 
head lines in each plant are composed of dedicated transfer machines. Any design change 
generally requires substantial time and capital investment to retool these machines. 
4.2. Nature of Flexibility 
As mentioned earlier, the product variety for cylinder heads is low. Thus range flexibility 
is not important in the current scenario. However, since majority of current and future 
cylinder heads will be manufactured in the new facility and since demand for different 
engines can vary substantially within the cycle plan, it is imperative that the centralized 
plant exhibit both the ability to switch production among different types of cylinder 
heads6 and maintain uniform performance at different volumes and mix. This will help 
achieve the objectives of the new manufacturing strategy (improve capacity utilization 
while responding rapidly and economically to changing consumer demands). 
6As mentioned earlier, the ability to change nimbly from making one product to another is also referred as mobility. 
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Although, current management knows that they need the ability to nimbly change 
from making one type of cylinder head to another while maintaining adequate 
performance, lack of coordination between product strategy and manufacturing strategy 
planning7 could prove to be problematic. This is because manufacturing managers would 
need to establish the boundaries of product changes they could expect during the planning 
year. Thus, it is imperative that the current management focus on improving the 
integration of product strategy and manufacturing strategy planning to truly make their 
plants mobile. 
4.3. Nature of Resource Required 
Workforce 
In terms of workforce, management would need to deal with a couple of major issues. 
First, the workforce would need adequate skills to operate and maintain the flexible 
equipment. In an internal pilot study involving high speed machining, lack of proper 
operator training was identified as a major cause of pilot failure. Second, the number of 
job classifications within the plant would need consolidation. This is because in the new 
flexible environment workers should be allowed to easily move from one job function 
(e.g. machine operation) to another (e.g. tool maintenance). Under the current system, 
machine operation and tool maintenance are two separate job functions that are 
performed by different individuals and can't be swapped among employees prior to union 
approval. Third, operators would need sufficient empowerment to make minor repairs 
and adjustment to machines instead of waiting for a formal machinist to come through so 
Currently, powertrain product planning and manufacturing planning are part of two separate organizations. 
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as to keep high machine uptime. Finally, the policy of job assignment based on seniority 
would need modification to allow young and skilled employees to become machine 
operators as well. This is because there could be a likelihood that these younger 
employees are more adept at running new hi-tech machines compared to older employees. 
It is important to realize that management doesn't have any strategy in place to 
deal with aforementioned issues. Further, management doesn't consider workforce to be 
an important tool in providing flexibility in the plant. The current view is very much 
focused on achieving flexibility through technology. 
Technology 
On the technology front, there are two major issues that management should concentrate 
on. First, they need to make sure that they don't excessively automate the manufacturing 
process. For instance, in the past, use of automated material handling systems (such as 
gantries) in engine plants was found to be the biggest inhibitor to modifying machines for 
manufacturing new cylinder head variants. Second, they should consult with the product 
strategy group to determine what type manufacturing capabilities they would need to 
handle possible future product variations. 
4.4. Measuring Flexibility 
Most of the current performance measurables used in Ford engine plants are either 
focused on cost (e.g. total cost, inventory turns etc.) or on operation efficiency (e.g. build 
to schedule, dock-to-dock, first time through quality, equipment efficiency etc.) and have 
no connection to flexibility. Thus, new measurables, such as changeover times, 





help management gauge the performance of flexibility. Unfortunately, in Ford Powertrain 
plants, new performance measures are received with skepticism and are considered flavor 
of the month. This can be, however, avoided through proactive plant involvement in 
setting these measurables and thorough proper workforce training and communication. 
4.5. Internal Processes 
As long as the new plant adheres to guidelines of Ford Production System, most internal 
plant processes will fall in place on their own. However, there are few that might need 
additional streamlining. For instance, in one of the internal Ford studies it was identified 
that a tool change, in addition to hardware changes, required updating 20 different 
documents in the system. Similarly, procedures for machine capability checking and for 
quality inspection might need changes due to the presence of flexible machines. Some of 
these procedures or processes can be easily handled with the help of information 
technology. The underlying issue is that although one might have best in class equipment 
and workforce, if the accompanying processes are still not efficient, the performance of 
the whole system would degrade especially relative to competition. 
4.6. Management Attitude 
The timing of the new strategy couldn't be better. Currently, there is universal acceptance 
among various managerial echelons to enhance plant flexibility. In addition, new and 
young management is much more open to new ideas and work practices. Also, 
management is convinced that they need to keep certain strategic assets on the balance 
sheet for long-term competitiveness. 
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4.7. Distribution Diseconomies 
There are going to be handful of distribution diseconomies specific to this strategy. First, 
unit cost of cylinder heads, and hence engines, could increase due to added cost of 
transporting these heads from one centralized plant to network of various engine plants. 
For a simple of case of consolidating production of two different types of cylinder heads 
in a centralized plant, added transportation cost per unit was estimated to be 2% of the 
total per unit cost of the cylinder head. Considering that production volumes for cylinder 
heads could be huge (e.g. 600K - 1300K), this added cost can become substantial unless 
negated by cost reduction afforded by economies of scale. Second, addition of an extra 
link between engine and cylinder head could increase the response time to diagnose 
engine problems that are related to cylinder heads. This could be, however, addressed by 
having a liaison engineer coordinating activities between the engine plant and the cylinder 
head plant. Finally, there is danger of increased inventory both in the pipeline and in the 
plants. Pipeline inventory might increase because of added transportation delay (Little's 
Law Effect). The plant inventory might increase because of tendency to have safety stock 
in the engine plant to obviate any risk of keeping the plant idle. Although, having the 
entire inventory in one plant generally help reduce aggregate inventory level, it works 
only when majority of the inventory consists of similar parts. However, in the current 
scenario, cylinder heads going to different plants will be different and hence overall 
inventory levels won't decrease due to centralization as one might expect. 
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4.8. Bureaucratization Diseconomies 
Bureaucratization won't be an issue because aggregate workforce and managerial levels 
won't change. On the contrary, centralized manufacturing will help reduce some of the 
bureaucracy. First, cylinder head section within central engineering will need to 
coordinate its activities only with one centralized plant instead of several engine plants. 
Second, the whole plant will be involved in activities related to cylinder head only, unlike 
previously. 
The only bureaucratization that might manifest is the increased community 
involvement if plant happens to grow enormously. This can be addressed by choosing a 
location where plant payroll would be small compared to surrounding population or by 
having two smaller plants in two different locations. 
4.9. Confusion Diseconomies 
Since cylinder head variations are limited to a small set, confusion diseconomies won't be 
an issue. Also, the complexity of operating a single cylinder head plant is still far less 
than that of an engine plant where lot more dissimilar parts and activities need to be 
coordinated. 
4.10. Risk Diseconomies 
This is definitely an issue especially considering that cylinder head is a critical engine 
component and that it would be hard to have any supplier retool itself quickly to produce 
cylinder heads in case of any calamity. Even if the product boundaries of the centralized 
plant are confined to certain cylinder head types only (e.g. six-cylinder engines only) and 
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there exists other engine plants with collocated manufacturing and assembly, it would be 
hard to retool these facilities quickly to produce different cylinder heads. 
4.11. Innovation Management: S3P Fit 
In section 3 we noted that successful implementation of an innovation requires a fit 
between firm's strategy, structure, systems and people. The following discussion attempts 
to use this framework to spot any potential roadblocks to the proposed strategy. 
Strategy 
Ford Motor Company's current corporate strategy focuses on improving shareholder 
value and responding swiftly to consumer needs. Since one of the objectives of the 
proposed manufacturing strategy is to have the ability to swiftly switch from 
manufacturing one type of cylinder head to another depending upon the market needs, 
there seem to be a good fit between the proposed manufacturing strategy and company's 
strategic vision. 
Structure 
Structure of an organization determines who reports to whom and who is responsible for 
what in order to successfully implement innovation strategies. In selecting right structure, 
we need to make sure that pertinent units within the firm have optimal amount of 
coordination and differentiation between them. One needs coordination because of the 
need of cross-functional interaction between the units. Similarly, differentiation is needed 
to focus on individual functional areas. The current structure within Powertrain 
Manufacturing comprises central engineering, managed by its own chief engineer and 
26 
section supervisors, and manufacturing plants managed by their respective plant mangers. 
Central engineering develops long-term manufacturing strategy and support plants on 
general manufacturing issues (e.g. poor part quality, poor tool life, upgrading technology 
etc.). Plants are therefore customers of central engineering. This type of structure has 
provided right mix of interaction and differentiation that is needed to help each group 
specialize in what their competencies are. However, the missing link in the structure is 
the lack of cross-functional relationship between powertrain product strategy and 
manufacturing strategy planning. As discussed earlier, the existence of this link is 
essential to achieve manufacturing flexibility. 
Systems 
According to Deming [4], proper organizational systems are needed to keep employees 
motivated and informed to carry out the assigned tasks and responsibilities. Fortunately, 
for powertrain manufacturing, some of the corporate measures (such as performance 
bonus plan, spirit of ford etc.) will help keep employees motivated and informed about 
firm's grand vision. Despite that, manufacturing management still need to emphasize and 
communicate to its employee force the role of new manufacturing strategy as an 
important enabler to firm's overall objectives. Based on the current situation where we 
have undergone several changes in the organization and where employees have 
complained about lack of management communication, this could become an issue. 
People 
In addition to being motivated and informed, it is also essential that people have the 
competencies to carry out their jobs. As mentioned earlier, current workforce has limited 
experience with the technology that would be used in the centralized flexible facility. 
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Consequently, it is imperative that management put extra emphases on providing 
necessary machine operating and maintenance training to it prospective workforce. 
4.12. Effect on Cost, Quality, and Timing 
Cost 
The proposed strategy has the potential to provide cost savings from two sources. First, 
savings will emanate from the economies of scale and scope net of the diseconomies 
discussed earlier. Based on an internal cost analysis8, these economies should come from 
reduced number of machines and reduced labor. Overall, scale and scope economies have 
the potential to provide cost reduction for machined cylinder head in the neighborhood of 
10%. Second, cost advantages will emanate from learning curve effects and from ability 
to change product mix and volume with minimal investment of capital and time. 
However, these cost savings are not quantifiable and will depend upon the overall 
execution of the strategy and advances in engine technology. 
Quality 
The product quality will remain at current level as long as centralized plant follows 
existing quality guidelines. For instance, according to the corporate quality initiative, all 
manufacturing plants (Vehicle and Powertrain Operations) within the company would 
adhere to various Ford Production System (FPS) disciplines, improve process capabilities 
to 1.67 or better, get Ql to QS9000 certification, and follow company's quality process 
system. Over the long run one can expect quality to improve because of learning. 
8 Since cost analysis data is company confidential, it is not included in the report. 
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Timing 
Having flexible facilities with ability to retool quickly to manufacture different cylinder 
variants will certainly help improve the overall timing of the engine program. Despite the 
fact that management in powertrain product development is taking lead in simplifying 
product design and reducing product complexity, cylinder head, due to its strong 
influence on engine characteristics, would still exhibit most variations compared to other 
strategic components of the engine. Thus, flexible facility for cylinder head 
manufacturing would certainly help in improving launch time for new engine programs. 
5. Benchmarking 
This section presents benchmark data [7] on engine manufacturing at Honda Anna Plant 
and Toyota Georgetown Plant. The purpose of the discussion is to understand how these 
manufacturers have been able to handle flexibility and capacity utilization in their plants. 
5.1. Honda Anna Plant 
Honda Anna Plant produces both car and motor cycle engines. The plant manufactures 
five variants of four-cylinder engines (1.6L, VTEC and non-VTEC versions of 2.0L and 
2.3L) and four variants of six cylinder engines (3.0L, 2.5L, 3.2L, 3.5L) for Civic, Accord, 
Acura and Minivan. Anna plant does not make all of its 5Cs in-house. Components, such 
as camshafts, connecting rods, crankshafts and sometimes heads, are sourced from 
outside suppliers or Honda of Japan. Actual production of four- and six-cylinder engines 
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at Anna in 1998 approximates 900,000 units with plant-wide capacity utilization of 96%. 
Following are some key observations: 
• Plant has three flexible machining lines that are shared by four- and six-cylinder 
heads. The head variations, however, are not as drastic as seen on Ford head 
machining lines. Also, to maximize equipment utilization, these lines are run on 
three-shift schedule. 
• In V6 category, Anna Plant's productivity (measured in Hours Per Engine) is best-in-
class at 3.22, ahead of Ford Lima at 3.80 and Toyota Georgetown at 3.6 [7]. 
Productivity depends upon factors such as product design complexity, machine 
automation management, number of variations, outsourcing of 5Cs, and amount 
machining performed in-house. 
• Anna is much less automated than Toyota or Ford. The automation is used primarily 
for simple tasks such as loading and unloading heads. Honda believes that lower 
automation provides higher flexibility midst high level of product complexity. 
• 80% of the machines at Anna have been designed and manufactured in-house by 
EGA, an engineering division within Honda Motor. As Honda moves forward with 
new designs, the same team of product and equipment engineers are together to create 
flexible equipment to handle current and future designs. 
• Honda has developed its entire manufacturing system, including Anna, around batch 
size of 60. This type of batch build provides sequencing system in the line and helps 
Honda to get away with simple automation. Further, by building 60 units in row again 
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and again, Honda is able to build quality and error proofing into the routine of the 
process. 
5.2. Toyota Georgetown 
Georgetown is one of the two engine plants Toyota has in North America. Georgetown 
produces 2.2L four-cylinder engines for Camry and Solara, and 3.0L V6 engine for 
Avalon, Camry, Sienna and Solara. The total 1998 volume for engines is about 540,000 
units with capacity utilization of 99%. Following are some key observations: 
• Plant has two machining lines to manufacture heads. 
• The technology for machines is tried and proven in Japan before being shipped to 
North America. This helps them in maintaining and launching equipment efficiently. 
• Similar to Honda's Anna Plant, it also exhibits low level of automation in its engine 
plants compared to Ford. 
• Unlike Honda and Ford, it manufactures all its 5Cs in-house. 
• Toyota has long term contracts with their machine tool supplier on machine 
architecture. 
• Toyota production system, which is the model for industry, is the key enabler to its 
ability to get flexibility and capacity utilization from its facilities. For instance, it 
builds minivans and sedans on the same system unlike any other manufacturer in 
North America. Principles of TPS that focus on leveling work load, standardizing 
work, making process visible and instituting low cost error proofing devices are just 
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some of the factors that enable it to efficiently produce highly different products 
together. 
• Toyota's greatest strength is its excellent planning and execution. 
There are few key points that have emerged from this benchmarking. First, OEMs 
shouldn't rely on total machine solution to achieve plant flexibility, as indicated by low 
level of automation in Japanese plants. Second, OEMs need to work with their product 
design community and suppliers in order to create flexible equipment to handle current 
and future design changes. Finally, in spite of world class workforce and equipment, 
company's culture greatly influences firm's ability to become flexible (e.g. Toyota). 
6. Conclusions 
The new strategy, involving flexible and centralized manufacturing, proposed by 
Manufacturing and Plant Engineering Organization of Ford Powertrain Operations has 
been analyzed. Various decision areas, which management would need to focus on, have 
been identified. Exhibit 10 provides a possible migration path to successfully implement 
the proposed strategy. Key steps of this path are summarized as follows: 
> Integrate product strategy planning and manufacturing strategy planning both through 
joint reporting under the current matrix organization structure and through inter 
department rotations. This type of arrangement will provide right mix of interaction 
and differentiation that is needed to help each group specialize in their competencies. 
At the same it will help develop cross-functional relationship between these two 
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departments. Such a relationship is required to help manufacturing managers establish 
boundaries of product and volume changes they could expect during a planning year. 
> Develop strategy for workforce training. The training should not only focus on 
providing required machine operation and maintenance skills but also emphasize the 
importance of the new manufacturing strategy to workforce. Also, negotiate with 
unions (either at local level or at national level) to reduce number of job 
classifications within the plant. Additionally, educate manufacturing managers, 
through executive level communications, to view human resources as an important 
enabler to providing flexibility in the plant. The current view is very much focused on 
achieving flexibility through technology. 
> Prevent excessive automation of manufacturing process within the plant. In particular, 
extensive use of material handling systems, such as gantries, should be avoided. 
Japanese plants have very low level of plant automation yet exhibit high level of 
flexibility. Also, develop long-term supplier contract for the architecture of machine 
tools. 
> Develop new plant measures, such as changeover times, changeover cost, process 
lead-time, process range and the likes, to gauge the success of flexibility. These 
measures are essential for organizational learning and for replicating the strategy to 
other components or plants. Involve plants in setting up these measures to prevent 
them from being flavor of the month. 
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> Streamline in-plant processes, which might need modifications because of new ways 
of doing things under the proposed strategy (e.g. documenting tool change, checking 
machine capability). Professionals, both internal and external, who have experience in 
running flexible machines, should be consulted to understand which plant processes 
would need modification. 
> Consider two manufacturing plants, instead of one, and in different locations to avoid 
high involvement of surrounding community and risking everything under one roof. 
Additionally, have liaison engineer(s) either at the centralized plant or at the engine 
plant to coordinate activities between two plants especially considering the extra link 
between cylinder head manufacturing and engine assembly that the proposed strategy 
would create. Also, prevent excessive pipeline inventory and safety stock buildups 
through just-in-time manufacturing practices. 
In closing, the proposed strategy certainly has potential benefits of reducing cost and 
improving response time for Ford Powertrain Manufacturing. However, unless 
management addresses key issues that have been identified, these benefits would be hard 
to realize. 
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Exhibit 1. Major enablers for manufacturing flexibility and pros and cons of centralized 
manufacturing. 
Manufacturing flexibility enablers 




- Measuring flexibility 
- Management Attitude 
Centralized manufacturing 
Pros 
• Economies of scale and scope 
• Learning curve effect 
Cons 
• Distribution diseconomies 
• Bureaucratization diseconomies 
• Confusion diseconomies 
• Risk diseconomies 
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Exhibit 2. Capacity utilization of engine plants of Ford Motor Company (1999 Harbour 
Report) [7]. 
Engine Plant 
Chihuahua, Mexico (14) 
Cleveland #1, OH (V8) 
Cleveland #2, OH (V6) 
Dearborn, MI (14) 
Essex, Canada (V6) 
Lima, OH (14) 
Lima, OH (V6) 
Romeo, MI (V8) 
Windsor, Canada (V8, VIO) 










































































Skinner mentioned only delivery 
Decision Areas 
Wild (1980) - design and specification of the process and systems, location, layout, capacity and capability, 
design of work and jobs, scheduling of activities, quality, inventory, maintenance, replacement of facilities, 
and performance measurement. 
Buffa (1984) - capacity / location, product / process technology, workforce and job design, operating 
decisions, supplier and vertical integration, and positioning of systems. 
Skinner (1985) - plant and equipment, production planning and control, organization and management, 
labor and staffing, and product design and engineering. 
Hill (1985) - choice of alternative processes, tradeoffs embodied in the process choice, role of inventories 
in the process configurations, function support, manufacturing systems, control and procedures, work 
structuring and organizational structure. 
Find and Hax (1986) - capacity, facilities, vertical integration, process/technology, scope and new products 
policy, human resources, quality management, manufacture infrastructure, and vendors relations. 
Hayes et al. (1988) - capacity, facilities, technology, vertical integration, work force, quality, production 
planning and control, new product development, performance measurement, and organization. 
Slack (1989a) - design of the manufacturing system, management of product response, management of 
material flow, long term capacity, management of demand response, and manufacturing control system. 
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Exhibit 4. Selected results from Second Annual IndustryWeek Census of Manufactures. 
Manufacturing strategies for 21st century T151 
Strategy 
Enhanced flexibility and agility 
Cost reductions 
Focus on more competencies 
Streamlined production 
Reengineering or restructuring 
Integrated supply-chain management 
Plant modernization 
Enterprise integration 


















Quality, Cost, Timing Performance [141] 
Scrap and rework costs: 47% of plants pursuing strategy of enhanced flexibility reported 
scrap and rework costs less than 2% of sales. Among these, 31% have scrap and rework 
less than .5% of sales and 29% have scrap and rework less than .5% and 1.99% of sales. 
Warranty Costs: Plants following strategy of enhanced flexibility and agility represented 
30% of the respondents with warranty costs less between .5% and .99% of sales and 18% 
of respondents with warranty costs greater than 10%. 
Quality: 31% of the plants with a first pass quality of 99% to 100% are pursuing a 
strategy of enhanced flexibility and agility compared with 19% of plants with a first pass 
quality yield of 75% to 89.99%. 
Timing: Plants pursuing enhanced flexibility represented just 11 % of plants respondents 
with on-time delivery rate of less than 70%. 
38 
39 













Defects Schedule Cost 
Realization 
Payroll $ / Units shipped per week 
Material $ / Units shipped per week 
Inventory in plant / Material $ in units shipped 
# Shipments on time 
Defects at final test/ Units shipped per week 
Field Repairs / Units shipped in the field 
Percentage of total direct labor $ applied to inventory 






Exhibit 9. Decision areas and competitive priorities of the new manufacturing strategy. 




Exhibit 10. Roadmap to implement new manufacturing strategy. 
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